Scholars in this research tradition have argued that if we observe that voters respond to changes in objective performance indicators-such as an increasing unemployment rate or contracting gross domestic product (GDP) growth, as shown by Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978)-then the electorate as a whole holds policy makers accountable in an effective manner even though most individual voters possess little political knowledge and are generally disinterested in politics ( Page & Shapiro 1992).Īs Fiorina argued in Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (1981), citizens can implement effective accountability even if they lack basic political knowledge by focusing on simple performance metrics. As a result, the retrospective voter has generally been conceived of as a foil to the Michigan voter. Nearly every article and book on retrospective voting-the study of how citizens evaluate and act on their perceptions of government performance-cites The Responsible Electorate. In Key's view, voters updated their beliefs based on government performance. Key stated in The Responsible Electorate (1966) that “voters are not fools.” He argued that voters were capable of executing the vital tasks of citizenship required in a republican democracy. Challenging the Michigan School's conception of the American voter as lacking both knowledge about political issues and a coherent ideological structure ( Campbell et al. 2001).Īccordingly, scholars of political behavior have long analyzed how citizens consider events and outcomes in deciding whether to retain the incumbent (party). Many models of political economy assume that voters behave in such a fashion (e.g., Persson et al. Underlying these theoretical conceptions is a model of retrospective voting wherein citizens consider information on past government performance in order to make forward-looking decisions. Democratic governance is thus normatively appealing because elections should be an effective means of enhancing public welfare. Through this retrospective behavior, citizens can incentivize politicians by sanctioning poor performance ( Ferejohn 1986) and selecting leaders who will govern competently and honestly ( Fearon 1999). The evaluation of incumbent performance at the ballot box plays a key role in democratic accountability ( Besley 2006, Ashworth 2012). We discuss two additional issues for future exploration: a better understanding of normative benchmarks, and increased attention to the relationship between retrospective voting behavior and policy outcomes. Understanding the circumstances under which retrospective voting achieves effective democratic accountability and when it fails to do so is an important task for subsequent research. In other instances, voters make mistakes, often in predictable ways subject to well-known psychological biases. In many cases, a coherent logic governs voters' choices. Leveraging examples of retrospective voting in areas other than the economy, the field is heading toward a middle ground in which voters resemble decision makers in many other domains. As a whole, the recent literature provides a more complete and nuanced picture of the retrospective voter as sometimes, but not always, effectively incentivizing elected officials to enhance public welfare. We review advances in the study of retrospective voting, or how citizens evaluate and act on their perceptions of government performance.
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